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Searching for Happiness1
All human beings search for happiness – this assertion has been taken for granted at least since Aristotle wrote it down in his Nicomachean Ethics,2 which was 
translated into Latin during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and commented upon 
by a long line of famous theologians, the first two being Albert the Great and Thomas 
Aquinas.3 The contributions of Ancient philosophy and Christian tradition show a 
variety of ways in which people sought for happiness. But is not our modern way of 
searching for happiness very different from tradition in the sense that in former times, 
happiness was intimately linked to a general notion of virtue while today happiness is 
much more seen as in function of individual desires? In this article, a glance at some 
medieval authors show that at least some individual features of understanding happiness 
have been developed quite early in our Christian tradition. By referring to two Canadian 
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philosophers this paper wants to show that behind the presumed individualistic 
concept of happiness in our times, a deeply rooted quest to live a personal calling can 
be discovered. Both authors claim that ultimately a turning back upon oneself has its 
meaning if it enables us to recognize that we are related, and have always been related to 
other human beings, to nature, and to the source of all. Seeking personal happiness that 
can in a qualified way be interpreted as legitimate love of oneself can thus be regarded 
as a necessary ground for contributions also to the betterment of the society.
The Changing Role of Individual Search for Happiness - From an “Ethics 
of Self-Determining Freedom” to an “Ethics of Authenticity”(Charles 
Taylor)
That all human beings are searching for happiness sounds very familiar to us, 
and we also know the sharp criticisms that are brought forward against it: those 
of simply ‘promoting hedonism’, and of encouraging a false hierarchy of values. 
We might, of course, also ask the question, whether what is offered to us as a good 
for making us happy truly does so. But others might already be thinking that 
such a description of our societies seems to be a too superficial one, and indeed 
I would like to draw your attention to a deeper question which is related to this 
observation; namely, in what way the quest for personal happiness has become a 
matter of ethical concern. 
A first concern might be hedonism as a moral principle – and we can find long 
discussions about hedonistic elements in various ethical systems, and also about the 
question of whether pleasure can be regarded as an ethical principle.4 
A second concern may be pluralism as a characteristic feature of our societies. Here 
we come closer to the ethical problem which needs to be raised. Pluralism as a general 
concept, and understood as a descriptive term, represents a reality in our societies. It is 
not only a characteristic feature, however of our contemporary times. 
The background to our understanding of pluralism lies in the framework for earthly 
life and action that was shared by most of those who lived in preceding Christian societies: 
 4 See Elizabeth Telfer, Happiness. An Examination of a Hedonistic and Eudaemonistic Concept of 
Happiness and of the Relations Between Them, with a Consideration of How Far and in What Sense 
Either Kind of Happiness May be Said to be the Goal of Human Life (London et al., 1980).
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human beings were pursuing not only (their) earthly aims, but also a full and final 
happiness which was called beatitude.5 Though human beings walked different paths, 
they were in the end trying to reach the same goal – to reach the presence of God, which 
we call Heaven. This final dimension of human life and action, which was then believed 
to be shared by all human beings, is no longer a common vision in modern European 
societies. It has been replaced by many different ideas about life and its ultimate goals. For 
a postmodernist thinker, life could not have and should not have one goal, and the ideas 
about the way in which happiness should be sought are manifold.
But it is not the plurality of aims which bothers the philosophers in our age, which 
is often classed as the “postmodernist” one, so much – thanks to Jürgen Habermas 
and other thinkers who have proposed ways of approaching and dealing with ethical 
problems in a pluralistic society.6 Rather philosophers raise the question of on what 
basis individual human subjects should take moral positions in a pluralistic society. 
It was the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor7 who proposed that pluralism 
represented an ethical and political problem. What happens if people try to find 
orientation for their lives and for their happiness only in themselves, he asked. In his 
book entitled “The Ethics of Authenticity”, which was first published in 1991, under the 
title of “The Malaise of Modernity”, the Canadian philosopher described firstly what 
went wrong in our “culture of authenticity”, and then disclosed the ethical principles 
that underpinned and propelled it. For the moment, we will stay with the question of 
what he understands by a “culture of authenticity” and what he discovered to have gone 
wrong in cultures of this kind.
When Charles Taylor talks about a culture of authenticity, he talks about modern 
western societies and assertions that are characterised by a demand for authenticity on the 
part of their citizens. Authenticity, however, is a very broad term. The first connotations 
of the word that come to mind are in phrases like “the authentic teaching of the church” 
 5 This description follows the argument presented by Charles Taylor in his book The Ethics of 
Authenticity (Cambridge et al., 22003).
 6 Habermas’ development of a theory of rational-critical communication, and John Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance or justice theory can be seen as responding to the task of finding philosophical answers to 
the challenge of ethical decisions in a pluralistic society. 
 7 For an introduction to Charles Taylor see Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor (Cambridge, 2004); Ingeborg 
Breuer, Charles Taylor zur Einführung (Hamburg, 2000).
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or “an authentic interpretation of the Bible”. Authenticity stems from the Greek term 
authentes, which was translated into Latin as auctoritas.8 If we try to express what Charles 
Taylor understands by a “culture of authenticity”, we could say that he is talking about a 
culture in which every person is his or her own authority with respect to his or her life 
and actions. While this may still be an acceptable or even a commendable thing as such, 
what creates difficulties is that authority over our own individual lives inevitably goes 
hand in hand with a corresponding loss of a common framework of belief and of ethical 
orientation. Taylor’s critical analysis is well  known and has been developed further since it 
was first published, but it still can serve as a background against which the modern search 
for happiness needs to be defended. With regard to the ethical question of whether an 
individualistic search for happiness presents a threat to ethics, we can restrict ourselves 
to reminding the aspect of individualism which was developed next to instrumental 
reasoning and despotism as characteristics of our societies.
Individualism according to Taylor arises from a loss of collective meaning or moral 
standards, and which he relates to the loss of a more monolithic social and cultural 
order.9  What Taylor calls as soft relativism enters here; namely, the attitude grows 
that, since there is no common framework, all the different standpoints are equally 
right and therefore cannot be criticised – the result is a normative understanding of 
ethical pluralism and a strong individualistic approach to ethical questions. Against 
what he calls a soft relativism, a moral perspective which originates in the idea, caused 
by the originality of our natures that it is our personal feelings and choices which 
ought to determine the values that we choose to steer our lives, he argues that such a 
self-centred attitude leads to all personal feelings being regarded as insignificant, since 
they come to be seen as arbitrary, equally valid. What is more, they cannot be brought 
into a hierarchy, given that they lack an external and consequently common point of 
reference that would allow evaluation and judgement. Hence, he argues 
I can define my identity only against the background of things that 
matter. But to bracket out history, nature, society, the demands of 
 8 Klaus Kienzler-Max Seckler, “Authentizität. Systematisch-theologisch,” in Lexikon für Theologie und 
Kirche, Sonderausgabe, ed. Walter Kasper (Freiburg i.Br., 32006), 1:1287.
 9 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 3: “the individual lost something important along with the larger 
social and cosmic horizons of action.”
Searching for Happiness – Sigrid Müller 77
solidarity, everything but what I find in myself, would be to eliminate all 
candidates for what matters. Only if I exist in a world in which history, 
or the demands of nature, or the needs of my fellow human beings, or the 
duties of citizenship, or the call of God, or something else of this order 
matters crucially, can I define an identity for myself that is not trivial. 
Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the 
self; it supposes such demands.10 
His conclusion is that there are boundaries; namely things which we have to respect 
in our self-determining choices.11
This missing social linking together as one of the more dire consequences of a 
culture of authenticity is in fact Charles Taylor’s main concern.12 Ethically speaking, 
the described attitudes lead to an ethics of ‘self-determining freedom,’ which Charles 
Taylor describes as follows: “It is the idea that I am free when I decide for myself 
what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences…Self-determining 
freedom demands that I break the hold of all such external impositions, and decide for 
myself alone.”13
Taylor sees this as the expression of a turning point in the contemporary culture’s 
understanding of what it means to listen to one’s inner voice: we are not listening to 
our inner voice in order to hear what is right or wrong, and thus act rightly – a inner 
movement which we know well from our tradition of saying that we listen to the voice 
of our conscience. The turn that Charles Taylor observes is that we now listen to our 
inner voice, because we think that we can be truly human beings only by being in touch 
with ourselves, and that, since we are inalienably distinct from others, we need to find 
out “what being human is for me.”14  The moral idea that “I miss the point of my life” if I 
do not live according to what “is my way” gives rise to “the principle of originality: each 
of our voices has something of its own to say. Not only should I not fit my life to the 
 10 Ibid., 40-41. 
 11 Ibid., 68: “Because the notion of self-determining freedom, pushed to its limit, doesn’t recognize any 
boundaries, anything given that I have to respect in my exercise of self-determining choice.”
 12 Ibid., 3 and 4. The “dark side” which this individualism creates “is a centring on the self which both 
flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer in meaning, and less concerned with others or 
society.”
 13 Ibid., 27.
 14 Ibid., 26-29 (quotation).
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demands of external conformity; I can’t even find the model to live by outside myself. 
I can find it only within.”15  
No wonder that self-fulfilment and self-realisation, as Taylor goes on to explain, 
are seen as the primary goals of life and, we may add, as the best way to find personal 
happiness. This type of happiness obviously is not linked any longer to a virtuous life 
in the sense of virtues that are shared by everybody and can be regarded as constitutive 
of a society.
Probably we would not agree entirely with this description of our contemporary 
societies and the way we would need to see ourselves anymore, nor would we regard 
ourselves as the last few left, the “survivors” (Adorno), who think differently from 
the mass of others. Rather we would see the positive side to this development that 
was also depicted by Charles Taylor when he presented his critical account of the 
individualistic tendencies in our societies twenty years ago and proposed as an 
alternative to an ‘ethics of self-determining freedom’ an ‘ethics of authenticity’ that 
embraces social concerns in its proper understanding. The important difference 
between the two is the distinction between the manner and the content of an ethics 
of authenticity: 
Authenticity is clearly self-referential: this has to be my orientation….But 
this doesn’t mean that on another level the content must be self-referential: 
that my goals must express or fulfil my desires or aspirations, as against 
something that stands beyond these. I can find fulfilment in God, or a 
political cause, or tending the earth.16 
Taylor is referring to the fact that in earlier times the framework of orientation was 
a culturally established law or nature, which has in our times been replaced by a belief 
in the priority of choice. Taylor goes on to say: “Indeed the argument above suggests 
that we will find genuine fulfilment only in something like this, which has significance 
independent of us or our desires.”17 Thus, if I decide to live by an ethics of authenticity, 
I will take personal responsibility not only for what I do but also for the points of 
orientation which I choose to direct my decisions and actions. 
 15 Ibid., 29.
 16 Ibid., 82.
 17 Ibid.
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Taylor departs from the fact that human beings are fundamentally dialogical rather 
than monological by nature. Only through other human beings, through language, 
culture and love do we receive those pivotal moments which produce our identity. Even 
a hermit, he argues, is in dialogue with God, while a solitary artist is in dialogue with his 
work and its future audience.18 What is the aim of an ethics of authenticity, then, when 
it respects the basically dialogical structure of human nature? Taylor describes this aim 
in the following way: “…authenticity points us towards a more self-responsible form of 
life. It allows us to live (potentially) a fuller and more differentiated life, because more 
fully appropriated as our own.”19
Happiness Understood as Individual Perfection - On Earth and in 
Heaven ( John Versor)20 
Charles Taylor’s concept of an ethics of authenticity allows for individualism 
as manner but not as content of an ethical approach that respects the nature and 
relationships of human beings. While this seems to be an answer to a question that 
arose through very recent developments, it is interesting to see that already in the 
Middle Ages, that we usually conceive of as a period in which all human beings 
shared a common Christian world view, there were already ethical concepts that 
refer to individualistic concepts of happiness.21 One of these is presented by John 
 18 Ibid., 33.
 19 Ibid., 74.
 20 A lot of research has been conducted on the question of happiness in the thinking of Thomas 
Aquinas. A few examples are Stephen Wang, “Aquinas on Human Happiness and the Natural Desire 
for God,” New Blackfriars 88 (2007): 322-334; Colleen McCluskey, “Happiness and Freedom in 
Aquinas’ Theory of Action,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 9 (2000): 69-90; Denis J. M. Bradley, 
Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good. Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’ Moral Science 
(Washington, D.C., 1997); Jean M. Laporte, “Beatitude in the Structure of Aquinas’ (Summa). 
Is Ia 26 a Stray Question?,” Toronto Journal of Theology 18 (2002): 143-152; Otto H. Pesch,“Das 
Streben nach der ‘beatitudo’ bei Thomas von Aquin im Kontext seiner Theologie. Historische 
und systematische Fragen,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 52 (2005): 427-
453; Davide Venturi, “Beatitudo, bonum commune und lex beim hl. Thomas von Aquin,” Doctor 
Angelicus 5 (2005): 153-164; Hermann Kleber, Glück als Lebensziel. Untersuchungen zur Philosophie 
des Glücks bei Thomas von Aquin (Münster, 1988).
 21 For more information see Hans U. Wöhler, “Die philosophische Glückssuche im Mittelalter. 
Historische Streiflichter,” Scientia et religio (2005): 335-350.
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Versor22 (d. after 1482) – in French Le Tournant (“The Turner”) – who was a rector 
of the University of Paris. He is famous for being an intellectual disciple of two far 
more famous Dominicans, Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas.23 John shared 
with his predecessors that there were two kinds of happiness that human beings were 
seeking: there was a supernatural happiness, which could only be gained by grace, 
and there was also a natural happiness, which people aimed for in this life.24
Versor was convinced that human beings tried to be happy naturally through their 
actions and supernaturally through contemplation. If he were asked whether there 
was only one good which all persons were looking for, he would have answered that 
implicitly there was only one, but explicitly the individual aims of human beings varied 
greatly.25 In this respect, the difference between John’s opinion and what we think today 
was not very large. John Versor was not a follower of Plato’s philosophy and therefore 
did not think that it was of any help even to imagine a common idea of the good. He 
thought that contemplating a general idea would not give any practical help whatsoever 
to a craftsman or a medical doctor. Happiness, he emphasizes, is intimately related to 
what human beings do or produce,26 and therefore needs to vary. Nevertheless, what for 
 22 More information concerning John Versor see Max Heinze, “Versor, Johannes,” in Allgemeine 
Deutsche Biographie (ADB), ed. Rochus von Liliencrom (Leipzig, 1895), 39: 637f; Egbert P. Bos, 
John Versors’ Albertism in his Commentaries on Porphyry and the Categories, in Chemins de la 
Pensée Médiévale. Études offertes a Zénon Kaluza, ed. Paul J.J.M. Bakker (Turnhout, 2002), 47-78.
 23 Some doubts on John Versor’s discipleship have been formulated lately by Pepijn Rutten who stresses 
that his thought was far less independent upon either of his two great predecessors than was thought 
so far. See Pepijn Rutten, “Secundum Processum et Mentem Versoris: John Versor and his Relation 
to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered,” Vivarium 43 (2005): 292-336.
 24 John Versor, Quaestiones super libros ethicorum Aristotelis, Cologne 1494 [reprint Frankfurt/Main: 
Minerva 1967], fol. 6 v: Sciendum secundo quod duplex est felicitas. Quaedam est supernaturalis ad 
quam homo ex proporiis principiis pervenire non potest nisi iuvetur a primo efficiente per lumen glorie 
aut gracie. Et quia talis felicitas transcendit humane rationis investigationem, ideo de ista non est ad 
propositum. Alia est felicitas naturalis quam homo ex principiis naturalibus consequi potest. Et de tali 
est ad propositum. De qua contingit loqui dupliciter. Quia uno modo capitur felicitas pro simplici et 
perfectissimo bono quod naturaliter est homini possibile. Et quod est essentialiter ipsa felicitas. Alio 
modo capitur pro aggregatione ex illo perfectissimo bono et omnibus aliis bonis subservientibus sive sibi 
subserviant ut organa vel ut instrumenta vel ut decorantia illud perfectissimum bonum. Ut sunt bona 
nature ipsius corporis vel bona fortune ut sunt divitie artificiales aut naturales. 
 25 John Versor, fol. 2, r.
 26 John Versor fol. 6 r: Dubitatur secundo utrum si poneretur talis ydea ultima felicitatis hominis in ipsa 
consisteret. Ad hoc tamen respondetur quod non quia talis ydea non esset operatio hominis nec aliquid 
operatum. Sed contra hoc objicitur quia cognitio istius boni separati ad minus erit exemplum per quod 
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him could not be doubted was that these aims needed to be ranked hierarchically, and 
that the final aim of happiness was neither wealth nor reputation nor pleasure nor even 
virtue as such but the perfection of each individual person, which lay in the attainment 
of heavenly beatitude.27
John Versor’s concept is very stimulating and opens a bunch of questions related to 
happiness and ethics: Can living a virtuous life guarantee happiness in this life or in 
another life? Is virtue, or is happiness, the ultimate aim of life, after all? His answer that 
the perfection of each individual person was the last aim and not virtue nor happiness 
in a narrow sense of pleasure should be kept in mind.
But there was not only a hierarchy of aims but also a clear hierarchy of the goods 
that were attached to this life; for example, the more general goods were to be regarded 
as nobler than the more narrowly personal ones.28 This is the aspect which troubles 
Charles Taylor today. For John Versor, the noblest good could be described as one that 
human beings sought for itself (literally, per se) and not for some other purpose. This 
last and most perfect aim for all human beings, however, belonged neither to the sphere 
of ethics or politics as such. The study of God as the most perfect aim was the concern 
of theology. Only to the degree that belief in God influenced human actions, it did 
belong to the fields of ethics and politics.29 Thus, the highest aim was an individual 
perfection that could be gained only by God’s grace after death and resurrection, and 
the highest good that was pursued for itself was God. But what could be said about 
happiness and a good life on earth?
sciemus adipisci tale bonum. Ergo talis possessio boni non est utilis. Hoc autem improbat philosophus 
primo quia omnis ars habet inquirere illud quo necessario indiget ad suum finem. Sed nulla ars humana 
inquirit bonum separatum cum nihil facit ad constitutionem finis alicuius artis igitur etc. Secundo textor 
non adiuvatur in sui operis executionem per contemplationem talis ydee separate. Nec faber nec medicus 
quod exemplar debet esse conforme exemplato et operato. Sed operatum est particolare, ergo exemplar 
debet esse particulare. Ergo agnitio boni separati quod est universale nihil facit ad acquisitionem finis 
alicuius artis.
 27 John Versor, fol. 3 r. See also fol. 5 r.
 28 John Versor fol. 3 v.
 29 John Versor fol. 4 r: Ad terciam dicitur quod ultimus finis hominis simpliciter et secundum se 
consideratus non pertinet ad politicam, cum sit summum bonum simpliciter, sed magis pertinet ad 
alteriorem scientiam. Tamen ultimus finis hominis simpliciter sive ultimum obiectum consideratum 
secundum quod comparator ad mores bene pertinet ad politicam scientiam seu moralem, et ideo de 
felicitate agitur in hoc libro et in politica…
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According to John Versor, happiness generally taken consisted in “living well” and 
“acting well.”30 John explained that living well was acting according to virtue. The 
degrees of happiness could vary according to our improvement in the different kinds of 
virtue; achievement always remained imperfect, however, because it was not possible 
for human beings to maintain them uninterruptedly.31 John also thought that good 
human beings enjoy acting virtuously, that they feel pleasure when they do what is 
good.32 They can attribute their happiness to God, since they are able to do something 
that draws them nearer to God.33 By acting virtuously, they can at the same time make 
each other happy.34 
What might bring with us back from our short trip to the times of the rector of the 
late medieval University of Paris is the idea that people do go different ways in their 
search for happiness, both because they are in different situations and positions, and 
because they need to develop the virtues which are relevant in their particular case. We 
can agree with John’s suggestion that human beings can bring about the happiness of 
others and, to a certain degree, can contribute to their own happiness by trying to base 
their actions more and more on the basis of their own particular capabilities and gifts. 
Complete happiness, however, would consist in a personal perfection that reaches far 
beyond the scope of a virtuous life on earth and the happiness it involves.
However, what we surely cannot just take with us is the embeddedness of all human 
ways of searching for happiness in a larger common order that encompasses all human 
beings. There is no easy or immediate way back to it – if it ever has existed in a perfect 
form. According to Taylor there might still be intuitions of belonging to a greater order 
within ourselves, e.g. the feeling of belonging to nature, but our technically conditioned 
 30 John Versor fol. 4 v.
 31 John Versor fol. 7 v: Secunda conclusio. Felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam. Probatur 
quia eadem est operatio hominis et boni hominis. Sicut est eadem operatio cythariste et boni cythariste, 
scilicet catharisare. Sed operatio boni hominis est operatio secundum virtutem, quia virtus reddit 
operationem bonam...Et si sint plures virtutes hominis operatioque est secundum optimam illarum est 
felicitas.
 32 John Versor fol. 8 v: Operatio virtuosa in se habet delectaionem vel de ratione sua. Patet quia nullus 
diceret nomine istum qui non gaudere iustis operationibus. Ergo etc.
 33 John Versor, fol. 9 v: Ad secundam dicitur quod felicitas dicitur aliquid divinum non quia sit aliquid a 
deo sed quia propter excellentiam sue bonitatis facit aliquem similem deo.
 34 John Versor 9 r: Sed hoc non tollitur si felicitas ponatur inesse hominibus a deo movente mediante 
tamen labore humano. Ergo felicitas est a causa humana.
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culture does not help us express these kinds of intuitions.35 He is suggesting that perhaps 
the loss of a ‘sense of belonging’, which was strengthened through a commonly shared 
religious world view, needs to be compensated for by a stronger, more inner sense of 
linkage.36
This does not mean that we cannot discover common goods or some form of order 
in creation; however the relationship to such an order does not come automatically and 
necessarily, and it is not something that can be adopted from outside by the person but 
must be found within. The basic turn which is ethically relevant seems to be that some 
truths, even if they do exist independently of ourselves, need to be discovered anew and 
acknowledged by us individually as human beings. Only by taking the way through our 
own heart, may we successfully be able to recognize our place in the society in which we 
find ourselves; namely, in a larger community of human beings who are searching both 
individually and together for various goods, for happiness and many also for the large 
secret, which we call “God” and which we as Christians think has been revealed in history. 
An interesting point that we can find in John Versor is however that searching for 
happiness is legitimate, that in its content it is linked to the development of virtues that 
correspond to one’s individual life, and that the ultimate aim does not consist in virtue 
as self-perfection, but in personal perfection that cannot be reached completely during 
one’s earthly life, but is hoped for as gift of grace after resurrection.
Personal Happiness as Unpredictable Grace, and the Ethical Decision 
to Contribute to the Happiness of Others ( Jean Grondin)
Both the kind of inner sense of linkage as referred to by Taylor and Versor’s vision 
that it needs grace to reach happiness - at least in its fulfilling form - are taken up and 
integrated in the philosophical ethical approach of another Canadian philosopher, Jean 
Grondin.37 He starts by proposing an ‘ethics of meaning’ which invites us to dismiss for 
a moment - or for even longer, if we wish - our search for personal happiness.
 35 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 91.
 36 Ibid.
 37 Jean Grondin (born in 1955) studied philosophy and theology in Montreal, Heidelberg and 
Tübingen. He is a professor for philosophy at the University of Montreal and frequently teaches in 
Ottawa. He is acknowledged to be a renowned expert on Hans-Georg Gadamer and the question of 
hermeneutics. He has also published books on Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidegger.
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Grondin questions whether what all famous philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and 
Kant take for granted, namely that human beings search for happiness, is really true. 
He explains his doubts by examining the meaning of happiness in various European 
languages. While in the English language and in some others, ‘luck’, a fortunate 
coincidence is distinguished from ‘happiness’, a wonderful feeling of well-being, the 
contrary is the case in the German language: ‘luck’ and ‘happiness’ is signified by the 
same word, “Glück.” Luck and happiness are closely related to each other, he argues.38 
Grondin interprets the connection between luck and happiness in the following 
way: “Who is happy, is at the same time lucky, namely he or she is blessed by fortune.” 
He thinks that “There is no recipe to bring about happiness: We receive it (often 
without noticing), and it enlivens us and elates us.”39 He relates this feeling to a word 
which sounds old-fashioned in our times outside a religious context; namely to the 
beatitude of the blessed, who after their life on earth live in eternal happiness because 
they live in God’s more immediate presence. For Grondin, being happy has to do with 
being fortunate: “We are simply lucky if we can call ourselves happy in this world”, he 
concludes. He relates happiness very much to grace.40
Grondin comes to the conclusion that we cannot produce happiness for ourselves, 
we can only hope for it. Therefore, he sheds some doubts on what Thomas Jefferson 
called one of the fundamental rights, namely the pursuit of happiness: “Is it possible”, 
Grondin asks, “to pursue one’s happiness?”41 His first argument is that every human 
being pursues slightly different goods in order to be happy; whether these are wealth, 
honour, lust or wisdom. How should we define happiness? We have seen the same 
question being raised in the fifteenth century, and where it remained equally open with 
respect to happiness, at least as far as our life on earth, as opposed to our life in Heaven 
is concerned.
Secondly he argues that nobody is able to make him- or herself permanently 
happy. He justifies his opinion by observing that we tend to fail to be happy just 
 38 Jean Grondin, Vom Sinn des Lebens (Göttingen, 2006), 71. English quotations are translated from 
the original German text by Sigrid Müller.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Ibid.
 41 Ibid., 73.
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when we explicitly aim for happiness, simply because happiness requires a pinch of 
unselfconsciousness.42 Certain moments in the life of married couples might easily 
come to mind in this regard; for example, when we try most hard to find happiness 
through our partner, he might be even less able to fulfil our desires as a consequence. 
On the other hand, when we do not expect anything from our partner but do what we 
deem is right to do, we might find ourselves distracted from our search for happiness 
and thus far more open towards actual feelings of unexpected happiness.
Jean Grondin then places his views of happiness in a broader perspective before 
drawing some general conclusions about the impossibility of producing one’s own 
happiness. According to him, we have a gravely erroneous vision of happiness in our 
society; a vision which, according to him, was heavily influenced by the Calvinist 
interpretation of wealth as a sign of God’s grace. This interpretation of Calvin’s theory 
of predestination would seem to explain why many of us today think we ourselves 
are the source of our own happiness and thus can make ourselves happy; for example, 
through working hard and spending wisely and modestly. The Canadian philosopher 
explains that all the popular literature of advice that we buy and read  - which tells 
us how to be happy in love, how to be happy by seeking physical health, how to be 
happy by guaranteeing success in business  -  build on the illusion that we can ‘make 
it  ourselves’. While he emphasises that there are good aims promoted in these guides, 
which should not be discarded, their basic claim remains one which is unquestionably 
counterproductive: If we think we can control all parts of our lives - time, happiness, 
health, love, friendship, and even death - we run the risk of losing what is much more 
important; namely, we lose touch with the existential reality of our human condition. 
Grondin quotes Matthew 6:27: “Can any of you by worrying add a single moment to 
your life-span?”43 
Grondin thinks that we risk losing touch with the primary sense, meaning, and 
purpose of our lives because we concentrate too much on issues of secondary importance. 
At the same time, a philosophy which really wants to speak about the meaning of our 
lives cannot and perhaps ought not to offer a recipe for happiness. It can only speak 
 42 Ibid., 72-75.
 43 Ibid., 75.
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about hopes and expectations which can bolster our intellects and spirits when we need 
to deal with both the happy and unhappy moments of our lives: with experiences of 
injustice; with evil; and death. He refrains from offering recipes for finding happiness, 
or even searching happiness, and concludes: “Our luck or happiness in case it exists, 
will come to us when and if it wants.”44
The Canadian philosopher draws the conclusion that even though we cannot 
provide for our own happiness, we can nevertheless contribute to the happiness of 
others - and this, he observes, is indeed the main goal of ethics. According to Grondin, 
philosophy is a way of reflecting upon what gives meaning to our lives. He points 
out that the activity of reflecting about the meaning of our existence encourages us 
to gain a much stronger consciousness of all the relationships and bonds that tie 
and weave our lives. This philosophical exercise is difficult, provisional, and never-
ending. It always accompanies our lives, fostering the aspects of meaning that we can 
find in their various periods and stages.45 It is important also to Grondin that, during 
this exercise, we realise that human beings do not come into the world without any 
relationships (in the words of Charles Taylor as “punctual selves”) subsequently 
choosing their relationships according to motives of utility. On the contrary, from 
the very beginning of their coming into the world, human beings are related to 
others, as they are to the meaning of their lives, to the Good, and we may add as 
theologians, to God.46 
Nevertheless, Grondin sees a difference between his own way of emphasising 
social bonds and the way Charles Taylor emphasizes them. Taylor is inclined to 
think that the remedy to a wrong understanding of authenticity as constructive 
selfishness consists in a communitarian vision of the individual; namely, of 
the individual’s involvement in a given culture and collective history, as well as 
to a political and national unit. Grondin argues that, especially in our times of 
globalisation, the search of individuals for meaning in their lives has become of far 
more pressing importance: 
 44 Ibid., 76.
 45 Ibid., 107.
 46 Ibid., 107-108.
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Everything that fastens me to the meaning and which creates hope in 
myself is the expectation of a life full of sense, firstly for the other, to help 
him or her to live in a way to see that his or her life has had sense and will 
have sense, and finally for my own life, which discovers a sense beyond 
myself. This is the case because my life is never only my life, but the life of 
everybody who shares the fate of being mortal.47 
Since our whole life is “in practice” a preparation for our dying, Grondin establishes, 
from a philosophical position, the imperative: “Conduct your life as if it were to be 
judged”.48
What are the criteria according to which one should live? Grondin explains them 
in the following way: “It is worth living for the others who expect something from us; 
I can fulfil their expectations and do even more than they expected from me. I can do 
this by making their lives less cruel, by adding justice, freedom and tenderness in their 
lives and adding to its tastefulness and meaning.”49 
To take care of oneself leads therefore to “taking care of the others and for the 
meaning in the life of the others.”50 In short, the meaning of life consists in “doing what 
is good and doing what one has to do in a good way.”51 Furthermore, it is love which 
counts because it answers to a love and meaning which is there before we start living –it 
helps us to transcend our own lives, thereby giving them flavour and sense.
Grondin refers to a phrase which goes back to St. John of the Cross: “At the evening 
of your life one will ask you only about the love you gave. Therefore learn how to love 
God as he wants to be loved and step back from what you are.”52
Searching Happiness by Doing What is Right in the Right Way, but 
Receiving Happiness by God’s Grace ( John Buridan)
Grondin’s conclusions invite us to make another journey back to the Middle Ages. 
The importance of the individual human life was emphasised especially in the Franciscan 
 47 Ibid., 108.
 48 Ibid., 116.
 49 Ibid., 113-114.
 50 Ibid., 117.
 51 Ibid., 118.
 52 Ibid., 125.
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tradition, and also in mystical traditions, during the Later Middle Ages. It has its source 
back further in the theology of St. Augustine (354-430). Since Augustine, the most 
influential theologian in the western Christendom up to and beyond the Middle Ages, 
an ethics based on love has been proposed as the proper expression of a Christian 
commitment. Again, it is a double understanding of love: the love of God and all that 
God has created. The difference he makes between God, on the one hand, and created 
things, on the other, is that God is the only good that is able to satisfy human desire. 
All other goods - and also other persons - are loved because of the greater good, namely 
God. If we relate this idea to our theme of searching for happiness, we can see that all 
happiness that is linked to goods which are not God can satisfy us only temporarily. 
Permanent rejoicing will only take place once we  arrive at  a more immediate union 
with God.
During the later Middle Ages, this was a central feature of Franciscan ethical 
approaches; for example, those developed by John Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham.53 They proposed that one could call an act morally good if one acted not 
only according to right reason but also out of the love of God. Ethics meant, in the 
end, making a rational choice from the perspective of what God wants me to do. The 
love of God is first in order, reason being simply a means to discovering it. This ethical 
approach could sometimes come close to an ethics of moral obligation: The first aim 
in ethics was to fulfil God’s will - a concept which somehow reminds us of the Kantian 
idea that I have the obligation to do what I recognize to be morally good, but I can 
only hope that my good decision and action will be at some stage rewarded by God. 
However, the late medieval Franciscans did not support the view that people should 
act under the pressure of obligation; they rather thought that the love of God moved 
human beings to do what they thought was according to God’s will. This was clearly a 
theological concept of ethics.
 53 Studies concerning Ockham see Sigrid Müller, Handeln in einer kontingenten Welt. Zu Begriff 
und Bedeutung der rechten Vernunft (recta ratio) bei Wilhelm von Ockham (Tübingen et al., 2012); 
Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Structure of Ockham’s Moral Theory,” Franciscan Studies 46 (1986): 
1-36; Paul Vincent Spade, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (Cambridge, 1999).
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Can this journey back into the Middle Ages help us to understand better the precise 
nature of today? The example of St. Augustine54 shows that there are good reasons 
for being self-centred in a good way; for example, the church further describes that 
listening to one’s inner voice is extremely important. A dialogue with oneself can lead 
to an encounter with God at the centre of oneself. Charles Taylor mentioned this 
both to show the dialogical structure of human beings, and also to say that people 
are directed towards others and that they should stop concentrating too much on 
themselves. But according to St. Augustine, it is extremely important to take the time 
to listen to one’s inner voice and to search for God inside oneself. As a second step only, 
the love which one receives from God will carry to the love of others, thereby putting 
into practice what has been inwardly experienced. What at first sight might look like a 
selfish concentration on the self, can become the source of a dedication to others.
It seems also that this movement that turns back towards oneself has gained 
significant importance from the point of view of ethics. What might be criticised as 
egoism, egocentrism, or autism can be a first stage during which individuals become 
aware of the fact that it is their personal task to take decisions and to be responsible 
for their actions. They may experience the need to think clearly about what they really 
want to do. The claim to be authentic also brings the challenge to take responsibility 
for everything a person does.
But what happens, we may ask, if people do not believe in God and, as a consequence, 
do not start their search for happiness from a Christian motivation to find out what 
God wants them to do? Or what about cases where the motivation to seek what is good 
because it is coterminous with the love of God simply does not play a role in a person’s 
life? 
If we asked an important writer on ethics of the fourteenth century, John Buridan, 
he would answer that ethics is the science which considers human beings from the 
perspective of their ability to act freely and their capability of achieving happiness 
(homo ut felicitabilis).55 At the heart of the ethics as a discipline must stand the human 
 54 Norbert Fischer, Die philosophische Frage nach Gott. Ein Gang durch ihre Stationen (Paderborn, 
1995), 370-378.
 55 Johannes Buridanus, Quaestiones super decem libros ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum (Paris, 
1513 [Reprint Minerva, 1968]), lib. 1, q. 3.
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being, with the capacity of humans to act freely, and thus responsibly, and their desire 
to be happy. The medieval theologians and philosophers understood happiness not as 
a state which one can gain, but as action in the form of doing right things in the right 
way. Buridan would have agreed with Grondin that even those who do not believe in 
God still need to seek to do what is virtuous if they want to be truly human. But he 
would have rejected Jean Grondin’s etymological analyses of happiness as being related 
to pure chance. John Buridan was convinced that happiness needed to come ultimately 
from God. Nevertheless, the way that he proposed it, was virtually the same; namely, to 
try to do what is right, and thereby live a virtuous life. 
Grondin does not presuppose religious belief when he expounds his approach. 
He just recognizes that without a religious belief, the driving force of actions in 
our lives is the hope that my life and the life of the other human beings do have 
meaning. He also thinks that, in answering to this hope, human persons will engage 
in helping others, so that they will be able to see their lives as meaningful, and 
thereby attain to happiness. He believes that, looking back later, such people will 
be able to say that their lives were meaningful. In order to be able to reach this aim, 
however, we need to be prepared to listen both to ourselves and others in order to 
feel and taste what life is about. 
One question seems to remain to us in this search to understand where happiness 
lies. Should one follow Grondin and give up on searching for our own happiness? Does 
an “ethics of meaning”, as Grondin’s approach was named, renounce entirely on the 
human search for happiness? The Christian tradition would probably not recommend 
us to do so. What Grondin asks of his readers is that they act as if they were to be 
judged at the end of their lives, not according to whether they had followed a set of 
externally established norms, but according to whether they had lived meaningfully; 
namely, whether they had tried to understand the meaning of their lives and whether 
they had loved as much as they could according to their capacity to love. While this 
involves trying to be unselfish, it does not mean that one should not love oneself or 
not seek happiness. But, just as in the medieval commentaries that were mentioned, 
happiness cannot simply be equated with pleasure, as Taylor and Grondin have likewise 
argued. Happiness could rather be described as knowing that what I am doing now 
contributes to making both my life and the lives of others more meaningful. Understood 
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in this deeper sense, even Grondin’s vision can be reconciled with the tradition of the 
philosophers and theologians who say that all human beings search for happiness.
Conclusion
The contributions of Christian tradition can help us to think more clearly about 
the many ways in which people seek to be virtuous and search for happiness. The two 
Canadian philosophers have shown us that, behind the individualistic tendencies of 
our times, a deeply rooted quest to live a personal calling can be discovered. Both claim 
that ultimately a turning back upon oneself has its meaning if it enables us to recognise 
that we are related, and have always been related to other human beings, to nature, and 
to the source of all. Love of myself, together with the time to think about who I am and 
where I need to go; about who and what will sustain me in times of despair and trouble; 
time to ponder the meaning of the brief span of life that I received; and to contemplate 
how far my faith in God and my hope can carry and protect me; such a love of myself 
is a deep and necessary resource for the love and care that I wish to give to others, and 
to enable me to contribute to the betterment of the society in which I live. Such a life, 
says St. Augustin, ‘sapit’; it has flavour. It is the way to deep happiness.
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